By Arthur Boutellis, Senior Advisor at TrustWorks

In the twenty-first century, peace is increasingly commodified. Mediation—once the preserve of diplomats and statesmen—has become an arena for entrepreneurs in search of both influence and profit.

A ceasefire has finally come into effect in Gaza after the Israeli government approved a US-brokered deal with Hamas, after Israel and Hamas signed off on the first phase of Donald Trump’s 20-Point Plan to end the war. This first phase includes a ceasefire, the release of all 20 living and 28 deceased Israeli hostages and around 250 Palestinian prisoners and 1,700 detainees from Gaza, Israeli troops pulling back to a line that has leaves them in control of 53% of Gaza, and a surge in humanitarian aid.

Further negotiations are expected to flesh out the details of the subsequent phases, which are more complex and politically sensitive. These include the deployment of an International Stabilisation Force (ISF), the decommissioning of Hamas’s weapons, transitional governance arrangements, the reconstruction of Gaza, and—under the plan’s enigmatic but essential 20th point—US-facilitated talks “between Israel and the Palestinians to agree on a political horizon for peaceful and prosperous co-existence.”

Two real estate developers reportedly played a significant part in closing this initial deal on behalf of the White House: billionaire Steve Witkoff, Trump’s Middle East envoy, and Jared Kushner, his son-in-law. Both made initial calls from Miami before flying to Sharm el-Sheikh to join interlocuters from Qatar, Egypt, and Türkiye—the regional mediators that had been trying for weeks to convince Hamas to accept the deal. In doing so, Trump appears to have followed one of the rules he set out in his book The Art of the Deal (1987): use your leverage.

This business-style approach to peace mediation prioritizes coercive leverage and rapid dealmaking—even if that means welcoming Hamas’s “yes, but” response while threatening “complete obliteration” should it refuse. This time, in the wake of Israel’s strike on Qatar, Trump applied pressure not only on Hamas but also on the Israeli government. Nevertheless, the latest mediation effort reflects a continuation of past US mediation practices that have consistently been criticized for being partial toward Israel and prioritizing national interests over equitable conflict resolution. Many of the plan’s details—particularly around the transitional arrangements and the longer-term political process that Israel’s current government continues to resist—have been left for later negotiations.

That is not, in itself, a bad thing. Saving lives must come first, and mediators have long used constructive ambiguity as a tool to create political space. Yet observers warn that the ceasefire could fall apart unless outside powers—above all, the US—keep up the pressure on both Israel and Hamas to stick to their promises. Analysts have also noted that this plan will not end Israel’s siege of Gaza or the mass displacement and suffering of Palestinians. The agreement, presented to Palestinians largely as fait accompli, nonetheless received post facto endorsement from President Mahmoud Abbas, who attended the Sharm El-Sheikh Peace Summit.

The Gaza deal reflects a broader global trend: ceasefires are becoming increasingly central to peace processes. While many powerful states are turning to mediation as an instrument of influence, growing divisions among the so-called “great powers” have made it more difficult for them to exert sustained, coordinated pressure on conflict parties. This has contributed to a growing reluctance among conflict parties to pursue comprehensive political settlements.

Like the deal in Gaza, many contemporary peace agreements—especially those effectively imposed by “power mediators”—take the form of broad framework deals rather than detailed roadmaps with timelines and accountability mechanisms. Implementation is often slow and uncertain, particularly when the parties do not trust each other and engage in little direct dialogue. Ultimately, the later stages of any peace process demand extensive technical expertise to facilitate dialogue between the parties, work out the details, prevent renewed violence, and support reconciliation. In the case of the Gaza deal, there will be a need for expertise far beyond what 200 US soldiers and an international stabilization force could realistically provide.

Dealmakers bring valuable skills to peace mediation, including pragmatism, persistence, and a results-oriented mindset. Yet there is a fundamental difference between dealmaking and peacemaking. In the business world, dealmaking focuses on bargaining between positions. It is inherently transactional, zero-sum, and contractual: one party transfers ownership to another in exchange for payment. Peacemaking, by contrast, seeks to shift parties from bargaining over fixed positions to addressing their underlying interests and needs in pursuit of durable “win-win” outcomes. It aims to build trust, transform relationships, and address the structural and historical injustices that gave rise to conflict.

Fifteen years ago, Swisspeace and the Center for Security Studies at ETH Zurich published “Money Makers as Peace Makers?”—one of the few studies exploring how business actors can support mediation. The report found that while businesses can play constructive roles by leveraging networks, offering logistical support, or incentivizing agreements, many hesitate to engage for fear of the reputational risks of veering too far into political domains. This sometimes has led to missed opportunities. The authors advised mediators to bridge the interests and strategies of business actors and peace professionals.

In today’s Gaza diplomacy, however, business itself seems to have become a core motivation for some would-be peacemakers. Gulf countries have reportedly promised Trump trillions of dollars in investment in the US, underscoring the commercial incentives driving this mediation effort. Trump and several Israeli officials have even called Gaza “an important piece of real estate.” The logic echoes the 2020 Abraham Accords—a set of transactional deals that normalized Israel’s relations with several Arab states while excluding Palestinians from the process.

Business interests have long influenced peace processes—implicitly and explicitly, licitly and illicitly. Yet recent examples, from US diplomacy in Ukraine and the Middle East to Gulf-led mediation efforts in parts of Africa, suggest that commercial ties between mediators and conflict parties are beginning to outweigh genuine peacemaking goals. The result risks hollowing out the quality and sustainability of peace itself, reducing it to elite bargains that entrench rather than resolve the power imbalances driving violent conflict in the first place.

Transactional and principled approaches need not be incompatible, but balance is essential. Dealmakers may be able to help broker short-term ceasefires or pressure parties at critical moments. Yet principled peacemakers are still needed to help the parties negotiate deeper political compromises and accompany them on their path to lasting peace and reconciliation. To achieve that, mediators and conflict parties alike must ensure they are not sidelined by dealmaking, or they will be left to live with its consequences. The enduring challenge is to harness the pragmatism of business without surrendering the moral purpose of peace.

The views expressed here are those of the author and do not reflect the position or policies of TrustWorks Global. With appreciation to Josie Lianna Kaye and Alexander Costy for their insightful comments on earlier versions of this piece.